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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOHN R. SWAUGER, 
vs. 
Appellant) 
\ Case No. 7316 
W. C. LAWLER, 
Respondent.\ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is upon the judgment roll and records of 
this case in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County. 
The action .ts one for the sum of $1000.00 and interest 
on a loan made December 3, 1945 to the respondent by the 
appellant. (R. 1). An answer was filed by the respondent, 
being a general Jenial and containing no affirmative defense 
(R. 5). 
Pursuant to a proper demand for trial, due and regular 
notice of the time and place of trial was given to the defendant 
in conformance 'vith the duly established rules of the Third 
District Court. 
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On April 7, 1948 the case came on regularly for trial 
before the court, Judge Clarence E. Baker presiding over said 
trial. Both parties appeared at said trial by their counsel. 
Appellant had travelled many miles from Salmon, Idaho, 
having left his business there to attend trial, (R. 35) and 
testified on his own behalf as to the loan and non-payment 
thereof. Respondent failed to appear or to notify the court 
of his inability to be present. Judge Baker for good cause 
thereupon overruled respondent's counsel's motion for a con-
tinuance and proceeded with trial. After hearing the evidence 
and the plaintiff submitting to cross-examination, judgment 
was granted to John R. Swauger, plaintiff and appellant, 
April 7, 1948, for the sum prayed. Said order was made in 
the present of counsel for both parties. 
Findings of Fact and Judgment were duly served upon 
respondent's attorneys on April 8th and signed and filed by 
Judge Baker on April 9th (R. 13-15). Nqtice of judgment 
and demand for payment thereof was served upon respondent's 
attorneys on Apnl 9th. 
Under date of April 12th, 1948 respondent's attorneys 
s~rved and filed a ((Motion for New Trial," (R. 19) setting 
forth substantially the statutory grounds and stating that 
affidavits were to be filed. No affidavit in support thereof 
was filed within the permissive five day period, or at all. After 
according respondent ample opportunity to file an affidavit 
in support of the motion for new trial, said motion was duly 
called up for hearing for May 22, 1948 (R. 20). 
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On May 22nd said motion for new trial was. argued by 
counsel of record for both parties and Judge Baker in the 
presence of counsel thereupon entered his Order, May 22, 
1948, denying said motion for new trial (R. 21). 
Execution was issued to enforce payment of the judgment 
and on June 17, 1948 respondent's Mercury station wagon was 
levied upon by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County and impounded. 
On June 22, 1948, respondent made an affidavit and motion 
to quash the execution and noticed the matter for argument 
for June 28th. On said date neither respondent nor his counsel 
appeared and the motion was stricken from the calendar (R. 
26). 
On July 8th, 92 days after trial of the case and the Judge's 
oral order granting judgment and 90 days after entry of 
written judgment, respondent served and filed a ((Motion to 
Open or Vacate Judgment," (R. 30) and an affidavit to 
support the motion, the same date calling up his motion for 
argument on August 5th (R. 31). Said motion was resisted 
(R. 35-36). On said date the motion was argued by both 
counsel and taken under advisement. By minute order dated 
October 15, 1948, (R. 34) Judge Baker vacated and set aside 
the judgment thereby permitting respondent to have a new 
trial. 
Demand for trial was at once made and on December 6, 
1948 an C(Amended Answer" was filed asserting a new and 
different defense alleging a purported corporate investment, 
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an entirely new theory, which was abandoned at trial and 
excluded from the Findings of Fact and from the Second 
Amended Answer filed after trial of the case (R. · 48). 
Upon re-trial of the case, over objections of appellant, 
before a different Judge, the issues were found against appel-
lant and judgment of ((no cause of action" entered January 10, 
1949 (R. 53). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The District Court was without jurisdiction to hear 
the motion to vacate and grant the new trial. 
2. The Order denying the Motion for New Trial was 
res adjudicata as to the issues involved in vacating the judg-
ment and granting thereby a new trial. 
3. The defe_,ldant is guilty of latches tn failing to file 
his affidavit in support of the motion for new trial and hence 
barred from later asserting such. 
4. The Cour~ erred and abused its discretion in granting 
the Motion to Vacate the Judgment. 
5. The Court erred and abused its discretion in permitting 
the amendment of the Answer in said case. 
ARGUMENT I. 
The District Court was without jurisdiction to hear the 
motion to vacate the judgment and grant thereby a new trial. 
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.On May 22, 194g the defendant's motion for new trial was 
argued before the court by counsel on both sides and thereupon 
denied (R. 21). Full and ample opportunity was presented 
to the defendant to assert any grounds which he considered 
sufficient to warrant a new trial. 
By the Motion to Vacate Judgment filed July 8, l948 the 
defendant in essence was seeking a rehearing on the motion 
for a new trial. It is the function of the Supreme Court to 
review on appeal, by proper procedure, the granting or: denying 
of that motion for new trial. The District Court was without 
jurisdiction thereon. 
In the case of Luke vs. Coletnan, 113 Pac. 1023; 38 Utah 
383, a very similar situation developed. Judgment was en-
tered in favor of the defendant. A motion for new trial was 
filed, heard and submitted October 17, 1908. On October 
28th the motion was overruled. December 19th the plaintiff 
filed a petition and motion to grant a rehearing and reargument 
of the motion for new trial. Said motion was not acted upon 
until June 3, 1909 when -it was denied. · 
Before the Supreme Court it was urged that the appeal 
filed November 4, 1909 was 1 not taken within time. The 
plaintiff urged that the finality of the judgment was suspended 
by the pendency of the motion for rehearing. Your Supreme 
Court held: 
CCW e think the District Court had not the power to 
entertain such a motion. It is unknown to our prac-
tice. In California, where the practice relating to 
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new trials is similar to ours, it is firmly established 
that the Court has no power to reopen the question 
of granting or denying a motion for a new trial after 
disposing of it." 
c c In the next place, the power of the district court . 
to rehear and re-examine the cause was once invoked 
by plaintiff's first application for a retrial. After the 
application was denied, to then also permit a petition 
to rehear and re-examine the order denying the motion 
is in effect to allow the limited time within a motion 
for a new trial may be made to be enlarged and to 
render the proceedings after judgment interrninable. 
There must be some point where the losing party 
turned over to the appellate court for redress. Coombs 
v. Hibberd, supra. We think the district court was 
without jurisdiction to entertain the application for 
rehearing; that the judgment became final '\vhen the 
court, on the 28th day of October, 1908, denied the 
motion for a new trial; and that the appeal taken on 
the 4th day of November, 1909, was therefore too late." 
This decision has not been modified or reversed. Then 
as now, there existed what is our Section 104-14-4, Utah Code 
Annotated, 194') in substantially identical language. To 
permit the proceeding followed by Judge Baker in this present 
case, leads to chaos. No certainty of status can be assured 
to a client. The orderly procedure of appeal to your Court 
is thwarted. 
It is pertinent to observe that no steps have been taken 
to change or recall the motion denying a new trial. Thus 
two diametrically opposed orders of the court still stand. 
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ARGlJMENT II - III 
The Order denying the Motion for Netv Trial (R. 21) 
iJ 1'es ajudicata as to the issues raised by the motion. Among 
the grounds stated for the said Motion are these: 
(a) Irregularity in the proceedings of the Court, and 
of the adverse party, and in the orders of the Court, and 
abuse of discretion by which the defendant was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(b) Accident and surprise which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
(c) Newly discovered evidence, material for· the defend-
ant, which he could not with reasonable diligence have dis-
covered and produced at the trial. 
These same tssues were again raised by the Motion to 
Vacate the Judgment and the accompanying affidavit: By 
hearing and granting said last motion, the court failed to 
abide by its earlier decision on the same issues. The defendant 
was given two clear chances to raise and argue the same legal 
principles involved. 
All of the facts stated in the belated affidavit were known 
to the defendant c-~.nd his legal counsel prior to the time of filing 
the motion for new trial on April 12, 1948. This is estab-
lished by the affidavit (R. 28) wherein it states that the 
defendant on his return to Salt Lake City on April 7th (tim-
mediately contacted his attorney." 
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' 
Still it was not· until July 8, 1948-, after defendant had 
failed in _h~s ·effort under purported bankruptcy proceedings 
( \ ' . 
(R.- 22) to resain the Mercury Station Wagon impounde? 
by the Sheriff pursuant to th~ execut~on, th3;t any affidavit 
- -" - -
was made or filed on the facts. By dilatory conduct the 
defendant and his counseL stalled and delayed the proceedings. 
Absolutely no excuse is shown in the record for not filing 
the affidavit in time for_ the Court to have the same before 
it when considering the Motion for ~New Trial. Obviously 
the purported grounds must not have been stated to his counsel 
by the defendant. I , > ' ' '' J 
This is a clear case where the defendant should be 
estopped, because ,of hi~ .. latches, __ from ass~rting the plea for_ 
equitable relief 92 ~days a~ter"theJ judgment ~idered in ApriL, 
The basic maxim of ((clean hands">-applies: He· who seeks. 
~quity should -do equi_ry,. and shou~d avail himself of the relief 
w,ithin a reasona~le . time. , T!Ie delay of months incurred 
~erein was wholly :unreas9nable._ (~~e Mcfl4illan t:JS. Forsythe,: 
47 Ut. 571; 154 P. 959). 
This appell2nt has suffered grievously. .Jn accord with 
the established rules of trial, he left his business in Salmon, 
Idaho, and attended at Salt Lake City, Utah on the date set. 
By the rehearing arid reversal on· the motion ~or new trial, 
Judge Baker' erroneously forced him to again travel, in the 
dead of winter, the lohg distance and to again appear at triaf 
and meet, !not the pleadings filed originally, but a defense of 
which he was not previously apprised by any existing pleadings. 
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The original answer (R. 5) in January was only a general 
. 
denial. The Amended Answer (R. 41) filed after the judg-
ment had been vacated, set forth a purported affirmative 
defense rejected by the court. Finally, after judgment, a Second 
Amended Answer was filed (R. 48) setting forth an entirely 
different theory. Here again, we urge that the defendant was 
guilty of latches in complying with the fundamental rule of 
a motion to vacate judgment, that a valid defense be promptly 
asserted. Apparently the defendant had not honestly advised 
his counsel of the facts of the case at any stage of the pro-
ceedings until the final, second trial. By this measure may 
the worth of his Affidavit be judged. 
ARGUMENT IV. 
The court e11~ed in granting the !Hotion to f7 acate Judg-
nzent. Practically 997o of the cases wherein a judgment has 
been vacated under section 104-14-4 are default judgments. 
This case is not such. The defendant's counsel duly appeared 
at the trial and cross-examined the plaintiff. No irregularities 
on the part of the court at the first trial have been asserted, 
as none existed. 
It is our position further that notice of the time of trial 
having been duly given in conformance with the rules of 
the court, and it being acknowledged by the defendant in his 
affidavit through his third counsel of record, that he knew 
of the time cf tr1al some seven days prior to the date thereof, 
that he was not entitled to have the relief prayed for. His 
counsel was diligent in advising him of the time and place 
of trial. 
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Your Supreme Court in the case of Campbell vs. Union 
Savings & lnvest"tlent Company, 63 Ut. 366; 226 Pac. 190, 
held that even in. a default judgment matter the court wquld 
not set aside the judgment so entered inasmuch as the rules 
of the court had been complied with as to the giving of notice 
to the parties litigant of the time of trial. It is obvious that 
such rnust be foliowed, otherwise the district court would be 
constantly imposed upon by applications of this nature whereby 
after setting aside other cases and attending at the time of trial, 
together with the one party litigant, the court would be 
requesed to give to the defendant additional time and addi-
tional consideration in the trial of a lawsuit. 
Particularly in this case we feel that the defendant is 
bound because competent legal counsel of the firm engaged 
by the defendant appeared and cross-examined the plaintiff 
and investigated the issues which they subsequnently raised. 
No allegation of neglect, omission or mistake by his attorneys 
has been raised. 
The only reason why the defendant was not in attendance 
was that he carelessly and recklessly conducted himself so 
as to be absent. He is presumed to have intended the result 
which followed his conduct. Only his self-serving affidavit 
tends to excuse his absence from trial. 
In the case of Peterson vs. Crosier, 29 Utah 235; 81 Pac. 
860, a defendant, againt whom judgment had been taken, 
sought to have the judgment vacated upon the basis that had he 
attended the tri3.1 he would have lost his employment. That 
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ground was denied by your court. The defendant Lawler 
in this particular case finds himself practically in the same 
situation, except that he was personally represented by legal 
counsel at the trtt-.1. 1-fr. Lawler preferred to attend to other 
business by reason of a bad check issued to him, knowing of 
the time of trial, the areas ivolved and, if his alleged physical 
condition does exist, such was also known to him. The plaintiff, 
Mr. s~'auger, and his father came from Salmon, Idaho to 
attend at the time of trial, set aside their other business and 
paid their expenses of transportation, lodging and necessary 
costs in attending the trial at the time set by this court. Legal 
counsel and the court set aside other matters to attend the trial. 
It would be manifestly unjust, on the merits of this 
matter, to ratify the granting of the new trial for the reason 
that the defendant had the benefit of cross examination of 
the plaintiff and then amended his answer so as to present 
to the court the purported defense referred to in the affidavit. 
The only issue ~efore the court at the time of the first trial 
was the execution of the loan for $1000.00, as all the defendant 
filed was a general denial of the plaintiff's complaint. See: 
Peterson vs. Croszer (supra). 
No place in the pleadings does the defendant offer to do 
equity in this matter. The records in this case will show that 
nothing was done by way of this motion to vacate until the 
nintieth day after written judgment and then not until the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County had impounded the defendant's 
station wagon pursuant to an execution duly issued by the 
court. Now he has imposed upon the court the burden of a 
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rehearing on the motion denying a new trial and without 
seeking to do equity himself. Even if such second trial were 
legally, available to him, he has wrongfully imposed upon the 
plaintiff the cost and expetfse of additional travel to Salt Lake 
to attend at the trial and re-litigation of the matters already 
adjudicated. 
Additional cases may be cited to affirm the general rule 
that a judgment once entered by a court of competent juris-
diction, in the prese~1ce of counsel for both parties, after 
introduction of evidence at a time duly set and noticed, pursuant 
to the court's rules, will not be set aside or vacated. As to 
default judgments, the matter is one of discretion. Here, 
however, we submit that after denying the motion for new 
trial the court had no jurisdiction to vacate the judgment and 
further, if by any strained construction it is felt that juris-
diction and power still remained to vacate the judgment, the 
court grossly abused its discretion in granting the motion to 
vacate. 
At this time by the judgment roll, your court has before 
it all of the facts, re.:ords and affidavits before the District 
Court on these is:;ues. You may review the same as to facts 
and law and determine the issues. You are not bound by 
the Order of the District Court. You should by your decision, 
reinstate the first judgment entered herein in favor of the 
plaintiff and appellant. 
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ARGUMENT V. 
We urge that the Distfict Court further erred and abused 
its discretion in allowing the defendant to amend his answer, 
after trial, after denial of his Motion for New Trial and after 
the t'acating of the judgment. As heretofore indicated, the 
defendant's attorney participated in the frist trial of the case 
upon the issues created by the pleadings. He cross-examined 
the plaintiff and then months later the defendant completely 
altered the theor r of his defense. Even this was again altered 
after final judgment by a Second Amended Answer. 
No equitable basis for amendment was asserted. No 
new evidence or other grounds were alleged. No surprise is 
even initimated as a supporting reason for the multiple 
shifting of theory. It is our firm contention that the court 
erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff (appellant) in tolerating 
such vacillating conduct. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully and emphatically 
urges that your Honorable Court review this matter fully and 
thereupon enter rc.n order cancelling and annuling the second 
judgment entered in this case, (on January 10, 1949) and 
that the October 15th, 1948 Order Vacating Judgment be 
annuled and the original judgment signed and filed April 9, 
1948 be fully reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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